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CHAPTER ONE 
GEOPOLITICS: GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY AND STRATEGY: 
A TRINITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Introduction 
This is a book about relationships and the puzzles they present. These 
two issues will be explored through a trinitarian structure. Understanding the 
manner in which geography, history and strategy interact and have produced 
political outcomes that have affected the security of states is the analytical 
objective.  Initially it would appear that this relationship is self-evident given 
the fact that the configuration of terrain, changing technology and political 
preferences are widely recognized as being pivotal to all security 
arrangements.  Deudney has pointed out, that there is a long history in 
attempting to develop explanatory power with respect to these variables: 
“geopolitical theorizing about the relationship between material contexts and 
security politics is also among the oldest and most central lines of argument 
in the 2,500 year project of Western political science.”1 
The Problem of Definition 
Despite this impressive intellectual lineage, which stretches back to 
antiquity, geopolitics in the early twenty first century has a three-fold 
problem. First there is the problem of definition.  Every theory is generated 
for someone and for some reason.  Geopolitical theory initially emerged -- 
from Aristotle to Montesquieu and Machiavelli -- as a result of a naturalist 
intellectual impulse.  In The Prince, Machiavelli suggested that mastery of 
geography is a key component to political survival: “He (the prince) should 
                                                 
1
 D. Deudney, “Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism,” European Journal of International 
Relations Vol 6, No 1 2000 p 78. 
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learn the nature of sites, and recognise how mountains rise, how valleys 
open up, how plains lie, and understand the nature of marshes--and in this 
invest the greatest care...and the prince who lacks this skill lacks the first 
part of what a Captain must have.”2 
There are numerous contemporary definitions of geopolitics. Many 
focus on an appreciation of the development  of  modern economies, 
changes in transport and weapons  technology, access to trade routes and 
resources. Aron has maintained that geopolitics “combines a geographical 
schematization of diplomatic – strategic relations with a geographic-
economic analysis of resources, with an interpretation of diplomatic attitudes 
as a result of the way of life and of the environment (sedentary, nomadic, 
agricultural, seafaring).”3 Gray has tried to disaggregate the concept to 
reveal its essential components: “Geopolitics is regarded here as a house 
with five rooms: geophysical resources; location; human resources--skills 
and culture; experience--the past, history, legends, myths; and mental 
cartography. These categories capture the sources of the political 
implications of geography.”4  Sloan focuses on the way in which these 
components should function together to generate explanations: “Geopolitical 
theory is an attempt to draw attention to the importance of certain 
geographical patterns in political history. It is a theory of spatial 
relationships and historical causation. From it explanations have been 
deduced which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of 
various geographical conceptualisations.”5  Grygiel maintains that 
geopolitical theory has three constituent elements: lines of communication 
                                                 
2
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3
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 C.S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p 125. 
5
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and their changing significance due to changes in transport and weapons 
technology, the location of sources of natural resources and the location of 
economic power.
6
 Furthermore, he has made an important claim about the 
nature of the geopolitical reality and its relationship to policy: “the first 
quality of geopolitics is its objectivity.  By this I mean that geopolitics, or 
the geopolitical situation, exists independently of the motivations and power 
of states and is not contingent on the perceptions of strategists and 
politicians”.7 
Applying a synthetic intellectual approach, all four definitions 
elucidate a common insight. Geopolitics is one of ‘grand theories’ of 
International Relations. It is illustrative of theorising in which inter-
relationships among a limited number of variables purport to explain a wide 
range of phenomena. 
The Problem of Usage and Currency 
The second problem is that of usage and currency. In terms of the 
modern literature of International Relations and Strategic Studies, it has 
become invisible.  In one of the most important text books on International 
Relations, edited by Baylis and Smith, there is no reference at all to 
geography or geopolitics, and there is only one reference to strategic 
interaction.
8
 In one of the leading text books on International Relations 
theory,
9
 one that has gone through three editions,
10
 there is no reference to 
                                                 
6
 For a more detailed discussion of these three elements see J.J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical 
Change, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp 26-36.  
7
 J.J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp 
24-25. Furthermore, he argues that a state has no capacity to change this geographic reality. Environmental 
changes take place over decades and a policy maker can only respond; he cannot control them. 
8
 See Baylis and Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p 314. 
9
 See Steans and Pettiford, An Introduction To International Relations Theory, Third Edition, Harlow: 
Pearson Education Limited, 2010.    
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 These editions were published in 2001.2005 and 2010.  
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geography or geopolitics. In terms of the field of Strategic Studies the 
situation is little better: in the recent monograph by Friedman
11
 there is only 
a brief treatment of geopolitics; in the monographs by Heuser
12
 and Hill
13
 
there is no explicit reference to geography or geopolitics and their 
relationship to strategy.  
There are two notable exceptions to this intellectual black hole into 
which geography has fallen in the field of mainstream international relations 
theory.  First is the work of Colin Gray, who has almost single-handedly 
addressed these relationships over nearly four decades of scholarship. In one 
of his most important works, he devotes a whole chapter to discussing 
‘Terrestrial Action.’14 The second is the work of Evans, who argued in 2001 
that the international security system had become ‘bifurcated’: that is, a split 
had emerged between the dominant state paradigm and sub-state and trans-
state strata. The implication of this, it was claimed, has been a reduction in 
the relative importance of geography in the traditional strategic sense: it was 
no longer possible for a state to retreat behind physical borders. However, he 
did qualify what he meant by the ‘relative decline’ of geography: “In no 
sense does such a phrase imply ‘the end of geography’ in the same sense that 
Francis Fukuyma famously spoke of ‘the end of history.’ In terms of 
logistics, campaign planning and topographical analysis, geography remains 
fundamental to the art of war, while geopolitics remains an important 
component of statecraft.”15  
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2010. 
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  See C.S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford; Oxford University Press 1999 Chapter 8.    
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 M. Evans, From Kadesh to Kandahar, Military Theory and the Future of War, from Strategic Studies A 
Reader. T.G.Mahnken & J.A. Maiolo (eds) London : Routledge  2014 p393-394.     
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This lacuna flies in the face of the epistemological parameters of 
Strategic Studies. Wylie has argued that while strategy cannot lay claim to 
have the same degree of rigour as the physical sciences, it is an academic 
subject in which geographical considerations play a crucial role: “It can and 
should be an intellectual discipline of the highest order, and the strategist 
should prepare himself to manage ideas with precision and clarity and 
imagination in order that his manipulation of physical realities, the tools of 
war may rise above the plane of mediocrity.”16 
This raises the question why has the usage of the geopolitical concept 
all but disappeared in the international relations literature?  One reason has 
to do with the close association in the Anglo-American mind with the Nazi 
geopolitik.  Hepple provides an assessment by illuminating the near terminal 
effect that the association of geopolitics with the German School of 
Geopolitics
17
 had: “ There does not seem to be any book title in English 
using the term geopolitics between the 1940s and Gray’s Geopolitics of the 
Nuclear Era in 1977 (with the exception of Sen’s Basic Principles of 
Geopolitics and History ,published in India in 1975)”18 The claim is also 
made that Henry Kissinger, in the late 1970s, was responsible for a revival 
of the term and gave important impetus to new directions in terms of writing 
on geopolitics.
19
  A second reason derives from the tendency in political 
science to rely on political variables when explaining political outcomes:  
Deudney has argued that: “In the human sciences, the dominant tendency 
was to look for the source of change in the development of human 
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 J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy :A General Theory of Power Control, Annapolis :UNIP, 1967 P?/ (check p 
number) 
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 For a detailed analysis of the origins and evolution of the German School of Geopolitics see G.R,Sloan, 
Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1890-1987, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books,1988 p23-57.   
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 L.W. Hepple, The revival of geopolitics ,Political Geography Quarterly ,Supplement to Vol 5, No 
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institutions and culture rather than in the physical environment.”20  Grygiel 
has summarized these two reasons as follows:  “The vast majority of current 
international relations literature is characterized by the absence of 
geography. Although the perverted versions of geopolitics, notably Nazi 
geopolitik, are partly to blame for the current distain for geography, the main 
cause for the academic irrelevance of geography seems to be the tendency to 
explain political realities only through political variables.”21   
This decline in the usage of the concept has not been replicated in the 
currency of the term. In fact there exists an acute paradox in this respect. 
Geopolitics has never been more popular on the internet. A recent Google 
search for geopolitics yielded 5,570,000 results. A search for a more 
qualified geopolitical theory produced 3,610,000 results.
22
 However, this 
widespread use has resulted in an etymological transformation: “the term 
‘geopolitics’ has enjoyed a ghostly afterlife, becoming a ubiquitously used 
while being largely drained of substantive theoretical content, and is used in 
so many ways as to be meaningless without further specification. Most 
contemporary usages of the term geopolitics are casual synonyms for realist 
views of international strategic rivalry and interaction.”23  
This ‘ghostly afterlife’ of a once vibrant intellectual concept has been 
further reinforced by the capture of the term by post- modern geographers. 
They added the adjective ‘critical.’  The result phrase, ‘critical geopolitics,’ 
suggests, according to Deundey,
24
 a strongly anti-materialistic vision, one 
that emphasizes the point that all geopolitical constructs serve an ideology 
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 D. Deudney, Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol 6,No 1 2000 p83.     
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while paying scant attention to how the strategic significance of geographic 
configurations change. Thus ‘critical geopolitics’ seeks to unmask how a 
geopolitical discourse reinforces power relationships, whether found in a 
specific text or in a general theory.
25
  It seeks “to define theoretically 
ideological clusters or ‘discursive formations’ which systematically organise 
knowledge and experience and repress alternatives through dominance.”26  It 
also claims a unique advantage and insight: “how social and political life is 
constructed through discourses. What is said or written by political elites–the 
whole community of government officials, political leaders, foreign policy 
experts and advisors–is a result of the unconscious adoption of rules of 
living, thinking, and speaking that are implicit in the texts, speeches, and 
documents. This group, on the other hand, is also considered to be the elite 
that guides the masses concerning how they should live”.27 The unmasking 
of the hidden assumptions behind every geopolitical speech or text is a 
precondition for unravelling  existing power structures and understanding  
geographic configurations.
28
 
Classical geopolitics is interpreted as the antithesis of this approach: 
“geopolitics (classical) refers to a fixed and objective geography 
constraining and directing the activities of states… such as the disposition of 
states in relation to the distribution of the continents and oceans, or fixed 
                                                 
25
 There is an academic journal dedicated to this task, Geopolitics. It promotes what could be described as 
the political branch of geography. One of its constant themes is the emphasis on globalism. An example of 
this literature may be found here: C Flint ,The Geopolitics of Laughter and Forgetting :A World Systems 
Interpretations of the Post –Modern Geopolitical Condition, Geopolitics, Vol 6 ,No 3 ,Winter 2001.p1 -16   
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Blackwell, 1993 p 161.  
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 S.R..Gokmen, Geopolitics  and the Study of International Relations. PhD thesis, Middle East Technical 
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 Two examples of this literature are : M. W. Lewis and K. E Wigen, The Myth of the Continents: A 
Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and J. M. Blaut, The 
Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 1993). 
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processes of territorial-economic expansion relative to military strength, are 
seen as determining the strategic possibilities and the limits of particular 
states”.29 Critical geopolitics makes a claim that is designed to change the 
meaning of the term: “by exposing the supposedly objective geographical 
element of geopolitics to be a contingent rather than absolute variable, 
critical geopolitics becomes the study of the power/knowledge networks that 
situate international politics”.30 Black has responded to this argument by 
claiming: “critical geopolitics challenges our common understandings of 
definitions, categories and relationships, by replacing them with, in some 
cases, utopian wishful thinking, by political commitment instead of an 
objective appreciation of the causes of conflict, by foreshortened historical 
understandings and by a loss of clarity in communicating ideas”.31 
The Problem of Paradigm and Ideology 
The third problem can be described as a paradigmatic and/or an 
ideological one. Perhaps the most common mistaken assumption about 
geopolitical theory is its symbiotic relationship to the Realist approach. This 
maintains that all thinking about international relations should begin with the 
recognition of the primacy of power and that geographical factors are a vital 
part of the assessment of power. Realism has always claimed to provide a 
practical guide to statecraft. It is here that the nexus with geopolitics was 
identified: “Some basic IR theory texts argue that realism provides a guide 
based on the principles of realpolitik, for states to pursue their preservation 
and interests. When defined as such, it is no different from geopolitics. This 
point also tells us that the consistency between classical geopolitics and 
                                                 
29
 J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space, London: Routledge, 1995, p 3.  
30
 J.P. Sharp, “Hegemony, Popular Culture and Geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the Construction of 
Danger”, Political Geography, Vol. 15, No. 67 (1996), p 559.  
31
 J. Black, Geopolitics, London: Social Affairs Unit, 2009, p 3.  
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realism turned out to be compulsory and inevitable.”32 Both approaches are 
assumed to have common perspectives: practitioners and analysts in the field 
of international relations assume the international arena to be anarchical; 
states are viewed as the primary actors in that arena; the fundamental aim of 
states is the pursuit of power; their ultimate goal is the achievement of 
primacy and failing that, security.  In short, the realist and the geopolitical 
analyst are assumed to share the same world view. 
Deudney has contested this point of view.  “Contrary to the 
contemporary identification of geopolitics with realism … early geopolitical 
theory gave prominent attention to the relationships between material 
context and liberal forms of political associations ranging from city–state 
republics to large federal unions.”33  Mackinder, one of the founders of 
classical geopolitical theory
34
 was an advocate of federalism in his seminal 
work Democratic Ideals and Reality
35
 .He believed that in these political 
structures as many functions should be devolved to provinces, regions and 
communities as possible.  This was better for people and their well being. In 
1931 he applied this hypothesis to international relations: “Unless I am  
mistaken, it is the message of geography that international co-operation in 
any future that we need consider must be based on the federal idea. If our 
civilization is not to go down in blind internecine conflict, there must be a 
development of world planning out of regional planning, just as regional 
planning has come out of town planning.”36   
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 Ibid  p177.  
33
 D. Deudney, Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism, European Journal of  International 
Relations, Vol 6,No 1 2000 p78.  
34
 Mackinder’s ideas will be fully examined in Chapter Two. 
35
 Chapter Seven of his book, which is titled the Freedom of Men, is devoted to this topic. 
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 H.J. Mackinder ,The Human Habitat, Records of the British Association of Advanced Science.1931, 
Quoted in. W. H. Parker: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft, Oxford :Clarendon Press .1982 p86.          
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Not only is classical geopolitics not tethered to the administrative state 
– with its standing armies and its top-down fiscal apparatus – but it is also 
not to be identified exclusively with conservative political ideologies.  In 
perhaps the most notable prediction to emerge out of an application of 
classical geopolitics, Collins distils its principles and hypotheses into a 
theory of explaining the stability of states and then applies that theory to the 
Soviet Union.  In his magisterial essay, “The Future Decline of the Russian 
Empire,” Collins predicted the breakdown of the Soviet Union due to the 
presence of unassimilated ethnic minorities that remained geographically 
concentrated in territories positioned along the rim of an empire dominated 
from Moscow by Russians.
37
  Collins, a conflict theorist and sociologist, was 
prompted to write this essay because he was concerned that the pressures the 
Reagan Administration applied to the Soviet Union could lead to a nuclear 
conflict.
38
   
Classical geopolitics is empirical in sprit; it recognizes the fact-based 
nature of geographic configurations, some of which may be overcome 
typically at great cost, economically or politically; but it is a grave mistake 
to believe that it is associated exclusively with any ideology or with any 
institutional framework for attaining a community’s security. 
 
The Contribution of Geopolitics 
These three problems notwithstanding there is a continuing relevance 
of geopolitics to international relations.  Geopolitics highlights the point that 
                                                 
37
 R. Collins, “Imperialism and Legitimacy: Weber’s Theory of Politics,” “Modern Technology and 
Geopolitics,” and “The Future Decline of the Russian Empire,” Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 145-166, 167-185, and 186-209. 
38
 For further comment on Collins’ prediction see L. Hochberg, The Language of National Insecurity: 
Prediction, Strategy, and Geopolitics,” Advances in Competitiveness Research 2002 (10, 1); 
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Advances-in-Competitiveness-Research/89491191.html, accessed 
September 8, 2015. 
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securing political predominance is not merely a question of having power in 
the sense of the availability of natural resources, the acquisition of wealth or 
a capacity for projecting force, but it is also dependent on the configuration 
of the field within which that power is exercised.  Over time, that field 
within which power is exercised may expand (or contract) given the 
changing nature of alliances, the emergence of new adversaries and enemies, 
shifts in where technological advances occur, mistaken policy decisions, and 
a number of other salient factors.  Obviously, one goal of policy makers is to 
extend the geographic configuration over which power is exercised.   
Geopolitical practice and the conceptualisations that it produces over 
time remain pertinent to the practice of international relations because 
“Geopolitical thinking is inherent to the very practice of foreign policy, 
though this is not always made explicit”.39 Furthermore, it is from choices 
made by policy makers that political importance or relevance is attached to 
geographical configurations or locations.  The geographical factors which 
influence politics are a product of policy makers selecting particular 
objectives and attempting to realise them by the conscious formulation 
strategies vis-à-vis potential or realized adversaries.  In short a geographical 
perspective is inevitable if an international policy is to be formulated and 
successfully implemented in the teeth of inevitable opposition: “In nearly all 
international transactions involving some element of opposition, resistance, 
struggle or conflict, the factors of location, space and distance between the 
interacting parties have been significant variables. This significance is 
embodies in the maxim, ‘power is local’. That is to say, political demands 
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 S.R. Gokmen, Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations, PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical 
University, August 2010 p192.    
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are projected through space from one location to another.”40 As a result, the 
formulation of foreign policy should remain cartographically dependent.
41
 
This  the departure point for understanding the contribution of 
geopolitics, both as a tool of analysis and as a guide to practice.  Since the 
industrial revolution, and the attendant technological revolutions in overland 
transport (via railway) and communication (via the telegraph), states have 
transformed the territorial jurisdiction through nationalizing the economy 
and centralizing political functions.
42
  Indeed, during the construction of 
railroads beyond the borders of a state and via favourable locations enabled 
imperial powers to attempt the assertion of economic hegemony, the 
projection of military force and the diffusion of values into previously 
isolated and/or contested regions.
43
   
Perhaps the most significant instance a geopolitically-inspired 
reconfiguration of terrain in the modern period was the building of the 
“artificial strait” connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific Oceans across the 
Isthmus of Panama.  Aguirre details the efforts by the foreign policy elite to 
secure the terrain through which the canal would be built, the construction of 
a doctrine of extra-territoriality to accommodate control, the geopolitical 
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 H, &M. Sprout, (to be finished) 
41
 J. Hillen, “Foreign Policy by Map: What Geopolitics Is, and Why We Need It.” National Review 
February 23, 2015; https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/413255/foreign-policy-map, accessed 
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 The literature on this point is extensive.  Examples include E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The 
Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); D. E. Showalter; 
Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany (Archon Books, 1975); S. G. 
Marks, Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).   
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 For instance, S. McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for 
World Power (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010); D. Lewis, Iron Horse Imperialism: The Southern Pacific 
of Mexico, 1880-1951 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007); D. Devine, Slavery, Scandal, and Steel 
Rails: The 1854 Gadsden Purchase and the Building of the Second Transcontinental Railroad Across 
Arizona and New Mexico Twenty-Five Years (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2004).  And for more recent 
examples, see M. Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
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consequences for the United States as it sought to become a nation with a 
two-ocean navy, and the current Panamanian repurposing of the Canal as a 
national asset over which they should have control.
44
  Once a reconfiguration 
of terrain occurs, policy makers must then face a new challenge.  The 
approaches to the reconfigured location must be secured, thereby potentially 
setting in motion a further round of power projection into new regions.
45
 
The Place of Geopolitics: A Trinitarian Perspective 
Geopolitics should therefore be considered a synthetic field of study, 
one that addresses questions at the confluence of three disparate academic 
disciplines and their fundamental concerns: geography, strategic studies, and 
history.
46
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Geo-strategy Historical Geography 
 
 GEOPOLITICS 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Diplomatic 
 History 
 
FIG 1.1 
                                                 
44
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Geography 
 At its core, geography is the study of the “manifold features, physical 
and human, which diversify the earth’s surface.”47 The physical 
configuration of the earth’s surface, its mountains, plains, deserts, rivers, 
coastline, and seas, remains the stage on which the human drama that is 
politics is played out.  Mountains and deserts were oftentimes barriers to 
human interaction whereas vast riverine plains opened before determined 
raiders, traders (in luxuries) and proselytizers.  In the pre-industrial world, 
overland travel was relatively easily achieved, provided provisions could be 
seized or purchased en route; however, travel overseas remained 
monopolized by those who could afford it.  In order to keep out or regulate 
the presence of undesired travellers, polities erected borders along defensible 
positions, ideally in mountainous terrain or along the banks of rivers.  The 
formation of states, which may be defined as the monopolization of the 
legitimate use of force within a jurisdiction, necessitated the creation of 
borders, ideally defensible borders.  Natural barriers, even when reinforced 
by defensive bulwarks and manned borders, have never achieved perfect 
security. 
Travel across the surface of the earth is only one feature of human 
geography; transport is another.  In the era prior to the mechanization of 
overland transport, the friction of terrain, even across the vast expanse of the 
Eurasian plains, limited the range of movement of bulky goods (even given 
the use of ox-drawn carts) to relatively short distances.  Maritime transport 
(historically relying on access to free energy in the form of buoyancy and 
wind power) facilitated the movement of bulky goods (given a ship and a 
                                                 
47
 S. W. Wooldridge and W. G. East, The Spirit and Purpose of Geography (London: Hutchinson 
University Library, 1967 reprint), p. 11. 
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crew that had to be fed) even over long distances, thereby enhancing an 
opportunity for regional specialization of production.  Given the variability 
of the earth’s surface, the opportunities and limitations for travel and 
transport enabled local populations to found polities that primarily operated 
through an overland exchange of communications among administrators and 
military officers, or through maritime exchanges of goods that generated 
great wealth.
48
  Ultimately the logistics underpinning these distinctive 
polities is grounded in physics and is the primary source the objectivity 
associated with the study of geography. 
Strategic Studies 
 The field of strategic studies, in the modern context, examines the 
interactions between or among adversaries, engaged in conflict, potential or 
realized.  A strategy is not merely a static plan of action, rather it is a 
dynamic awareness of one’s goals, an evaluation of the efficacy of means, 
and an appreciation of consequences – given the fact that one’s adversaries 
are also implementing their strategy to secure a desired, and perhaps even a 
mutually unattainable, outcome.  As one adversary becomes aware of 
opponents and their capabilities, means may change, even goals may change 
as the consequences of seeking that which may be achieved only at an 
unacceptable cost.   
 Strategic studies, at the individual or institutional level, often focus on 
stratagems for attaining economic success, power, or sexual gratification.
49
  
                                                 
48
 E. W. Fox, History in Geographic Perspective: The Other France (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971)  
49
   For a comprehensive treatment, see the multivolume effort by R. Greene, The 48 Laws of Power, The 
Art of Seduction, and Mastery, New York: Penguin Books, 2000; 2001, and New York: Viking Penguin, 
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Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld’s Rules: Leadership Lessons in Business, Politics, War, and Life (New York: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 2012).  For a game theoretic approach to this subject see A. K. Dixit and B. J. 
Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Poltiics and Everyday Life (New 
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Across time and space, adversarial relationships reveal five several essential 
processes.  First, parties engaged in conflict seek to surprise their enemies 
through the use of deception and propaganda; second, they clandestinely 
gather sensitive information by deploying spies; third, in order to obtain a 
competitive edge, they develop new military or productive technologies; 
fourth, by engaging allies through diplomacy, they negotiate favourable 
shifts in the balance of power; and, fifth, they resort to violence or the threat 
of violence in order advance their interests or preserve their security.
50
  
Adversarial relations are fraught with uncertainty; miscalculation and 
mistakes cannot be discounted in any analysis.  Parties to a conflict rarely 
know for certain what an adversary’s intentions, capabilities and tolerance 
for risk might be.  Therefore, in the heat of battle, which is the singular 
moment of strategic action, chance and contingency may overcome 
meticulous planning; and these uncertainties are termed the fog of war.
51
 
The process of making strategy is often elusive and hard to do: 
“strategy is neither policy nor armed combat; rather it is the bridge between 
them .The strategist can be thwarted if the military wages the wrong war 
well or the right war badly. Neither experts in politics and policy making nor 
experts in fighting need necessarily be experts in strategy. The strategist 
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must relate military power (strategic effect) to the goals of policy…Strategy 
is difficult because, among other things, it is neither fish nor fowl. It is 
essentially different from military skill or political competence.”52 It is 
through the use or the threat of the use of force that strategy has real 
purchase. 
History 
 History, the third aspect of the Trinitarian relationship that constitutes 
geopolitics, is traditionally defined as what historians do : “Historical study 
is not the study of the past but the study of present traces of the past.”  By 
emphasizing the collation and assessment of surviving documents, 
historians, such as G. R. Elton, believed their field of study could be saved 
from  preconceived notions.  Furthermore, he argued that historians have 
three “habits [of mind] peculiar to history: its concern with events, its 
concern with change, and its concern with the particular.” 53  For many 
traditionally minded historians, the “particulars” of the past are unique and 
the quest for understanding of the past is an appreciation of its difference 
from the present. 
All these claims are now hotly contested.
54
  Pertaining to the 
documentary fixation of history, E. H. Carr
55
 has argued:  
The fetishism … of facts was completed and justified by a 
fetishism of documents.  The documents were the Ark of the 
Covenant in the temple of facts.  The reverent historian 
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approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed 
tones.  If you find it in the documents, it is so.  But what, when 
we get down to it, do these documents—the decrees, the 
treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official 
correspondence, the private letters and diaries—tells us?  No 
document can tell us more than what the author of the 
document thought—what he thought had happened, what he 
thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what 
he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he 
himself thought he thought.  None of this means anything until 
the historian has got to work on it and deciphered it. 
The writing of history has changed, too.
56
  No longer is there an exclusive 
emphasis on change and events arrayed in a narrative.  Historians and social 
scientists
57
 have increasingly turned to writing about the “structures” of the 
past in which change, as their primary concern, has given way to an 
exploration of persistence. Some historians and social scientists have 
remained interested in change, but have abandoned the study of isolated, 
sharp, quick events in favour of a view of events embedded in long cycles.
58
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 From the perspective of geopolitics, history should be understood as 
an appreciation and utilization of temporal frameworks that enable an 
observer to describe and analyse conflicts that have occurred in the past or 
break out in the present, and possibly even predict their future emergence 
and resolution.  Whether the subject of geopolitics is the persistent 
geographic constraints on the options available to policy makers engaged in 
conflict,
59
 or the cyclical manner in which territorial integration and 
disintegration of dynastic empires occurs.
60
  Perhaps the most appropriate 
temporal approach to history, from the perspective of strategic studies, is the 
“analytical narrative,” an approach … [that] combines analytic tools ... with 
the narrative form….”61 This approach is simultaneously “analytic in that it 
extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both 
exposition and explanation.”  Why is the analytic narrative the desired 
approach?  Because the strategic element essential to the study of geopolitics 
requires that, at some point, the analyst will attempt to engage the disparate 
intentions, capabilities—technological and otherwise—goals, and/or risk 
calculus pertaining to the consequences of the parties to the conflict.  The 
great strengths of the analytic narrative approach are that it permits the 
analyst to tell stories of the back and forth of conflict, incorporate the 
assessments of the parties to the conflict—all from a robust appreciation of 
how strategy is related over time to geography. 
Connections 
Geography and Strategy: Geo-strategy 
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 In order to capture the connection between geography and strategy, 
Grygiel coined the holistic expression, geo-strategy. By this he meant, “the 
geographic focus of a state’s foreign policy, or where a state directs its 
power. It is a descriptive and not a normative concept because it does not 
propose where a state ought to direct its attention and project power.”62  In 
the context of the projection of force, where the study of strategy and 
geography overlap, logistics, which is the “practical art of moving armies 
and keeping them supplied,”63 stands out.  A large armed force is essentially 
a city on the move; it must be fed, fuelled and provided with ammunition if 
it is to be effective on the battlefield.  Thus, “[i]t follows that war, with its 
numerous tentacles, prefers to suck nourishment from main roads, populous 
towns, fertile valleys traversed by broad rivers, and buy coastal areas.  All 
this will indicate that the general influence that questions of supply can exert 
on the form and direction of [military] operations, as well as the choice of a 
theater of war and the lines of communication.”64 
 Obviously, since Clausewitz wrote these words, weaker military 
adversaries have come to adopt guerrilla warfare; they disperse forces 
amongst the civilian population that simultaneously provisions and hides the 
warriors until their more conventional opponents are worn down by 
attackers whose status as civilians or warriors remains in doubt.
65
  Although 
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the routes over which the materiel must move to the site of battle may be 
direct and efficient or hidden and dispersed, move it must, often across 
terrain that is inhospitable, broken, and even contested.
66
  As Sun-Tzu stated, 
“One who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines 
and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot maneuver the army.  One who 
does not employ local guides will not secure advantages of terrain.”67 
Sun Tzu’s book of aphorisms, The Art of War (400 BC), makes the 
following point: “know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never 
be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then 
be total”.68  Strategy must take into account geography and an acute 
appreciation of the actual terrain across which an armed force has to fight 
can be critical to success. Sun Tzu developed a typology that would be of 
utility to the military commander.  Geography not only shapes strategy but 
has a purchase on the operational and tactical levels of war: “warfare, the 
making of war, is first of all about the making the most of one’s chances 
with the constraints imposed by nature.”69 
 A successful military strategy has been accessed as having the 
following components: “clearly identifying political goals, assessing one’s 
comparative advantage relative to the enemy, calculating costs and benefits 
carefully, and examining the risks and rewards of alternating strategies.”70  
The purpose of military strategy is a singular one: “Strategy is designed to 
make war useable by the state, so it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its 
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political objectives.”71 Both these standard definitions fail to address 
relationship of geography with strategy.  Indeed, Gray has argued that this 
relationship between geography and strategy has become largely invisible: 
“so habituated are we to the affirmations of the importance of geography for 
strategy, and so arguable are those claims, that the theory explaining why 
and how geography really counts is, in effect, missing in action”.72 
Other analysts have suggested that a geographic perspective is 
essential to the realization of strategy.  Aron, for instance, underlined the 
centrality of this relationship in the following way: “Strategy is movement; it 
is influenced by means of transport or communication. The utilisation of the 
terrain is essential to tactics.”73 Owens has taken this point a step further by 
claiming that “by discerning broad geographical patterns, one may develop 
better strategic options by which a state can assert its place in the world”.74 
The state still has to ensure that the geographical structure of the field within 
which its power is exercised is as favourable as possible, while ensuring that 
its enemies or potential enemies are disadvantaged when operating within 
this same field.   
Political objectives should dictate military strategy; and strategy 
should anticipate how force is successfully projected from one location to 
the next, each of which contains configurations of both physical and human 
geography.  Proximate locations may often be perceived as roughly similar 
across a homogeneous region, but ultimately they are unique.  The very fact 
of proximity may, for instance, lead to a local rivalry, which is all but 
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invisible to an outsider.  Therefore, for the policy-maker and the military 
commander, understanding how geography mediates a state’s security is not 
a discretionary consideration.  Sir Julian Corbett, writing in 1911, addressed 
this issue: “since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues 
between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases 
– either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and 
national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your 
army to do.
75
  Beaufre drew attention to “material factors” in the different 
geo-strategic contexts of maritime and overland military activity: “the fact is 
that strategy must to a large extent be governed by material factors and the 
material factors characteristic of each field of activity differ, producing 
therefore a different chain of consequences applicable only to that field; for 
instance naval strategy has always been distinct from land strategy.”76  
Geography, when it is manifested as geo-strategy, can best be 
understood in the context of a specific theatre of military operations.  For the 
military commander, not every aspect of the fauna, flora, terrain and climate 
is of interest. Geographical features become more abstract, simplified and 
schematized in an effort to select for closer consideration only those 
geographical features that are relevant to the military objective.  
Cartographic design for military purposes reflects this consideration.  In a 
chapter entitled “Terrain,” Sun Tzu argued that every situation, and the 
options that it facilitated, should be subject to an analysis by the commander.  
The terrain and the way in which it may be used must be analyzed so that 
“clever positioning” could facilitate both tactical and operational advantage.  
The key relationship between the commander and these “positions” was the 
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need to recognise and analyse whatever new situation he found himself in: 
“To estimate the enemy situation and to calculate distances and the degree of 
difficulty of the terrain so as to control victory are virtues of the superior 
general.  He who fights with full knowledge of these factors is certain to 
win, he who does not will surely be defeated.”77  The ‘positions’ were 
abstract and relational concepts: accessible, entrapping, indecisive, 
constricted, Precipitous, and distant. In each, Sun Tzu outlined how the 
commander, must integrate these positions with his plans when conducting 
operations against an enemy. 
In the following chapter, entitled ‘The Nine Varieties of Ground,’ Sun 
Tzu focused on how troops can be deployed and employed to the greatest 
tactical advantage on the terrain that they find themselves.  Ground is 
classified as dispersive, frontier, key, communicating, focal, serious, 
difficult, encircled and death.  The ability to calibrate the use of troops 
against this diverse typology is regarded by Sun Tzu as the commander’s 
premier skill: “The tactical variations appropriate to the nine types of 
ground, the advantages of close or extended deployment, and the principles 
of human nature are matters the general must examine with the greatest 
care.”78 
Today these geographical considerations fall under the military’s term 
“combat intelligence”:  "leaders at all levels must therefore focus on those 
aspects that most directly affect their units' mission.  Platoon leaders 
concentrate on streams, ditches, wood lines, fields and individual hills; 
division commanders are concerned with transportation networks, drainage 
patterns and hill systems.  In either case, the leaders analyze the potential for 
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cover and concealment, movement and obstacle effect, and observation and 
direct fire effect."
79
Among the military, there is (and often unstated,) a 
powerful continuity between Sun Tzu’s aphorisms and the modern approach 
to informed leadership in combat. 
The relevance of geography to military operations has found 
expression in the classic writings of Carl Von Clausewitz.  In On War, 
which was published in 1832, there was a chapter titled “The Elements of 
Strategy” wherein Clausewitz developed a typology of key variables that a 
military commander must consider before engaging in battle.  They 
consisted of: psychological elements, including morale; military force, 
including its size, composition and organisation; geometry of the situation, 
including the relative positions and movements of forces and their 
relationships (distance, etc.) to obstacles, channels, objectives etc; terrain 
including mountains, rivers, woods and roads, all of which might influence 
military activities; and supply, including the amount given the size of the 
force, the means for securing it and the sources.  It can be suggested that the 
relative importance, scale, and components of these factors may have 
changed, but they remain the basic elements of strategy.
80
   
Where in these Clausewitzian elements of strategy is geography?  To 
Clasusewitz, the geometry of operations, the environment of operations, and 
the sources and means of support are all geographic elements.  This, in turn, 
raises the question: are these three geographic factors determinative of 
victory in land warfare?  Clausewitz was careful to spell out the key 
relationship that pertained between these three geographical based factors 
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and the psychological: “the effects of physical and psychological factors 
form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy is inseparable by 
chemical processes.  In formulating any rule concerning physical factors, the 
theorist must bear in mind the part that moral factors may play in it; 
otherwise he may be misled into making categorical statements that will be 
too timid and restricted, or else too sweeping and dogmatic.”81  Clearly, for 
Clausewitz, the question of supply may limit the capacity of an army to 
engage an enemy effectively, nevertheless the paucity of supply is never the 
final word – an army that is highly motivated may secure victory despite 
these limitations. 
Nor can we be certain that these three geographic factors discussed by 
Clausewitz are or have been equally useful in discussing the projection of 
naval and air power.  Gray has argued “the geographical dimension of 
strategy is ubiquitous and permanent, yet varied in its specific influence 
upon particular conflicts at particular times.”82  Peltier and Pearcy, in their 
1966 classic, argued that the three geographical mediums of war – land sea 
and air – have each their own geography at the tactical and operational level, 
albeit one that is highly abstract and schematized.
83
  In terms of land 
warfare, they claimed that three factors are important: objectives, channels, 
and obstacles.  There were two approaches to securing an objective: 
“separate into simple movements by a single force and multiple movements 
by divided forces.  The simple movements may be conducted as a direct 
assault along a front, a penetration or a flank attack.  The multiple 
movements may be in the form of diversionary action, convergent attack 
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including envelopment, or coordinated attack along a front.
84
  The ultimate 
military objective of land warfare consists of the exercise of control over a 
people; this goal does not apply for war conducted in the other two 
mediums, conflict on the sea or in the air.  Therefore, in all three mediums of 
war, there is no such thing, in an absolute sense, as a common target or 
objective, the identification of which depends in each upon the larger plan of 
war. 
Yet, the role of geography in land warfare depends greatly on the use 
to which both sides put contested terrain.  According to Winters, “The 
record shows that the outcomes of many battles are decided as much by the 
loser’s errors as the winner’s astuteness.  In that process geographical factors 
often have, in one way or another, a multiplying effect on a military 
operation.  The continuing problem is that no one can precisely predict how 
the environment will influence the progress or outcome of the next battle.  
All one can be sure of is that in some way they will be formidable.  Then, as 
unknowns appear, evolve and multiply, training, leadership, intelligence and 
innovation become increasingly important”85 
By way of contrast, the geography of warfare at sea has a focus on 
accessibility and mobility.  Except in the case of amphibious assault, the 
objectives of sea warfare focus on the mobility of ships and fleets.  Relative 
movement dominates the strategy of the sea. The speed of advance and 
radius of action have been the most important considerations.  The post-
1945 technological addition to maritime combat has been the introduction of 
radar, the impact of which has altered the range of target identifications and 
the range of fire.  The sustainability of movement at sea and related factors 
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depends to a degree on the presence of land support and basing.  In a 
geostrategic, sense the location of shore bases for resupply and repair 
facilities form the skeletal framework of a naval strategy.  This raises the 
question of the extent to which advantage can be derived from a far flung 
system of operating naval bases and well-equipped dispersed fleets? 
The geography of air warfare, while being unique in many respects, 
has elements which are redolent of both land and sea warfare.  Its 
geographic dimension is concerned with basing to promote target 
identification and accessibility which requires the presence of air bases 
within the range of the relevant aircraft.  Although the “area bombing” of the 
Second World War was the embryo of a strategic air force, the strategic 
function of air power came to prominence after 1945 with the advent of 
nuclear weapons.  However, since the late 1980s, technological innovations 
have been so remarkable that they have imbued non-nuclear air power with a 
qualitative improvement in its ability to achieve theatre joint-force 
objectives directly.
86
 
The key event prompting this re-evaluation of non-nuclear air power 
was the 1991 Persian Gulf War when the lethality and effectiveness of air 
weapons underwent the most dramatic transformation since the war in 
Vietnam:  “The prompt attainment of allied air control over Iraq during the 
opening night of operation ‘Desert Storm’ and, more important, what that 
control allowed allied air assets to accomplish afterwards by way of enabling 
the rapid achievement of the coalitions objectives on the ground marked, in 
the view of many, the final coming of age of air power.”87  The main change 
in recent military aviation technology has been the introduction of low 
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observability to enemy radar and infrared sensors, more commonly known 
as “stealth”.  The main implication of this technology has been the 
exponential growth of the two key elements of the geography of air warfare: 
target identification and accessibility.  “The large force packages that the US 
Air Force and Navy routinely employed during the air war over North 
Vietnam offered the only way of ensuring that enough aircraft would make it 
to their assigned target to deliver the number of bombs needed to achieve the 
desired outcome.  Today improved battle space awareness, heightened 
aircraft survivability, and increased weapons accuracy have made possible 
the effects of massing without having to mass.  As a result, air power can 
produce effects that were previously unattainable.”88 
If there is one independent variable that is frequently cited as having 
an impact on geography’s pertinence to strategy, it is technology: “strategic 
geography actually changes over time. The primary cause has been 
technological change.
89
  The consequence has been that new strategic 
circumstances came into being that posed fresh strategic problems”.90 Thus 
states do not find themselves in a geographical strait-jacket; instead, 
locations rise and fall in the calculus of strategic significance with the 
introduction of new technologies; politicians and military commanders rely 
on technological change to alter geographical configurations in their favour 
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and overcome those that seemed previously insuperable.
91
  However, the 
nature of this impact is not always straightforward: “at a time when 
precision-guided missiles can destroy a specific house hundreds of miles 
away, while leaving the adjacent one deliberately undamaged, small groups 
of turbaned irregulars can use tortuous features of an intricate mountain 
landscape to bedevil a superpower. In the latter case the revenge of 
geography is clear. But in the former case, too, those missiles have to be 
fired from somewhere, which requires a land or a sea base, thus bringing us 
back to geography, albeit to a less intimate and traditional kind”.92  
In the final analysis, the relationship between geography and strategy 
is a complex one. The strategic thinker must ensure that the geographical 
structure of the field in which military power is exercised remains as 
favourable as possible while ensuring that enemies, potential or otherwise, 
are disadvantaged with respect to the geography in which they must operate.  
Gooch acknowledged this by citing Britain’s historical experience: “while 
geography was fixed, strategic geography was not.  British strategy makers 
faced many difficulties in that the significance, value, and strategic 
vulnerability or defensibility of particular parts of the globe varied 
depending on political configuration and the level of sophistication of local 
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communications”.93  Though the technology may lead to a reassessment of 
the significance of a particular location, the security of communities, city 
states, nation states and empires is dependent on geography, or more 
specifically the scope and configuration of a field of military action.  
According to Gray: “Each geographically tailored form of military power 
contributes to the course and outcome of the war in the super-currency of 
strategic effect. This idea shapes the treatment of ‘the grammar of strategy’ 
across all distinctive geographical environments of conflict.” 94  The impact 
of geography on strategy occurs whether in providing opportunities, in 
imposing limitations and in shaping the deployment and utilization of armed 
forces.  Political goals in warfare must take these considerations into account 
for success to occur. 
Politics, too, shapes the execution of strategy in the geographical 
context and there is a complexity to this process which is rarely articulated.
95
 
Policy makers attach significance to certain locations based on strategy, but 
also on access to distant raw materials, the availability of far flung transport 
routes, and even attachments to sites of cultural import.
96
  The formation of 
strategy is a process that involves internal political influences and 
idiosyncrasies of individual behaviour as well as the process of external 
events and threats.
97
  The geographical factors which influence politics are a 
product of policy makers selecting particular objectives and attempting to 
realize them by the conscious formulation of strategies. A geographical 
perspective is required if policy is to be realised. 
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The relationship  between geography and strategy can be distilled to 
the ability of senior commanders to collect, collate and develop an 
understanding of the geography, given the technology at hand, that can be 
used as a force multiplier when preparing plans for war and implementing 
the conduct of operations.
98
  Senior military commanders recognize that 
their efforts must be effective given that which is known, that which is 
unknown and, in the Rumsfeld’s memorable phrase, the presence of 
“unknown unknowns.”99  Chief among the unknown unknowns is the ability 
of the adversary to surprise.  O’Sullivan argued that: “Geography is 
fundamental to the calculations and judgements involved in mobility and 
surprise and they have a dual relationship.  Movement creates surprise, and 
surprise generates movement. The possible configurations of this couple are 
constrained by the lie of the land and sea, the logistic possibilities and 
time.”100  Strategy depends on the conscious selection of certain 
geographical locations and the movements of forces, given the parameters of 
an overall plan, which must be flexible enough to encompass and respond to 
surprise, so that the possibility of defeating an enemy is enhanced or, in 
failing to achieve that ideal, survival of one’s own country’s is ensured. 
Geography and History:  State Formation and Disintegration 
Historical geography addresses how geography has shaped the 
formation of cultures, economies, societies and polities.  Thucydides, in the 
first book of The Peloponnesian War, encompassed geographic factors to 
explain the divergent paths Sparta and Athens took in becoming, 
respectively, the foremost military and naval powers in the era after the 
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Persian War.
101
  Despite frequent attempts by Enlightenment thinkers, such 
as Montesquieu, severe doubts remained over reliance on climate and other 
environmental factors in explaining political culture and institutions.
102
  
Hegel dissented from the use of geography as the determinant of political 
outcomes:  
Nature should not be rated too high or too low; the mild Ionic 
sky certainly contributed much to the charm of the Homeric 
poems, yet this alone can produce no Homer. Nor does it 
continue to produce them; under Turkish government no bards 
have arisen.
103
 
Nevertheless, social scientists have appreciated geographic factors as a 
significant determinant, if rarely the determinant, of political 
development.
104
 
In order to capture the nature of the political conflict  within, beyond 
and across the borders of states, the Swedish political scientist, Rudolf 
Kjellen,
105
 coined the term “geopolitics,” which was part of a typology 
designed to provide an understanding of how geography, which was but one 
element of an organic system of political science, would promote an 
understanding of the development and survival of a state.  In his 1901 book 
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titled “Staten Som Lifsform,”106 he argued that it was possible to identify 
laws that governed state development.  His aim was to parry a legalistic 
view that interpreted the state merely as the sum of the articles of its 
constitution and other basic laws. There were five important elements in 
Kjellen’s system of political science; the first was “Geopolitik,” which 
described the conditions and problems of the state which have their origins 
in its geographical characteristics, such as its position, configuration, and the 
nature of its territory.  Secondly, there was “Ecopolitik” which looked at the 
economic foundations of a state; the third was “Demopolitik” which looked 
at ethnic composition and the population trends of a particular state; the 
fourth was “Sociopolitik” which advanced a sociological perspective on the 
state; and the final was “Cratpolitik” which emphasized the governmental 
institutions comprising the state’s apparatus.  Despite this promising early 
start, geopolitics languished for many years as social scientists turned their 
attention to universal propositions pertaining to international conflict and 
state formation. 
In the aftermath of  the Second World War  social scientists focused 
on general theories of economic and political development.
107
 In the United 
States the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science 
Research Council sponsored a series of volumes on political development, 
one of the most notable of which was Crises and Sequences in Political 
Development.  This volume of collected essays addressed political and 
social development in Africa and elsewhere, sought to explain 
developmental outcomes as the result of how polities handled “the five 
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crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration and distribution .”108  
National security was not explicitly mentioned as a crisis and, to the extent 
territorial issues were discussed, they were subsumed under the crisis of 
identity (societies identify with the territory occupied) or the crisis of 
penetration and government capacity (polities must cope with conquest or 
regional variation.)
109
 
Four years after the publication of Crises and Sequences, an 
intellectual sea change occurred.
110
   Tilly edited volume 8 in the Studies in 
Political Development: The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe.  By narrowing the scope to the European historical experience, the 
contributors prioritized  the quest for national security, along with war 
making, policing, and military organizations in their analyses.
111
  In Stein 
Rokkan’s essay, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building.” a 
“cognitive map” of European development outlined titled “A Schematic 
Geopolitical Map of Europe.” . He articulated a five-fold a typology of 
regimes (i.e., “Seaward Peripheries,” “Seaward Empire-Nations,” “City-
State Consociations,” “Landward Empire-Nations,” and “Landward 
Peripheries.” It was an attempt to classify the early-modern starting points 
for European polities—within an overarching geopolitical context of 
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neighbouring regimes—as they began the respective processes of 
development or possible destruction.
112
   
The question of how geography has influenced the formation and 
survival of states and other political institutions, such as feudal monarchies, 
city-states or multinational empires, or maritime empires is of paramount 
importance.  The eternal and critical challenge that all statesmen face is how 
to ensure that their state as an organisation of land and people sustains itself 
as an organised unit. A key aspect of this is the need to ensure that the forces 
that bind disparate geographical regions and ethnic groups together are 
sustained. Furthermore, these forces need to hold at bay destructive forces, 
which are expressed politically, and could result in regional secession, 
revolution and state disintegration or conquest.
113
Geographic factors and 
how they are understood can explain the survival or disintegration of states. 
Geography is particularly useful in explaining how states survive.  
First, there is no such thing as a ‘natural’ state with ‘natural’ boundaries.  
Policy makers have to secure defensible borders, even at the risk of 
incorporating into their territorial jurisdiction irredentist populations.  Calls 
for socialization, sometimes strenuous in nature, directed at these minority 
populations represent attempts to advance loyalty among the citizenry. In the 
contemporary period, ethnic cleansing has resulted from this impulse toward 
homogeneity.  Political instability can arise from attempts of a particular  
ethnic group to give its folk traditions legal expression,  thus creating a 
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power struggle over social prestige and the economic benefits.
114
  The 
boundaries of a state are rarely coterminous with the national society living 
within the jurisdiction of a state—let alone coterminous with a fully 
integrated national economy.
115
  Because borders were in doubt, the holder 
of the final and legitimate decision-making authority, i.e. sovereignty, 
remained contested until such time that “a more permanent political 
geography” was established. 116    
Second, because commerce may traverse the borders of the state, the 
impetus to control—abolish, regulate and tax—it is a significant impetus to 
the formation of the modern state.
117
  Feudal lords claimed the power to 
regulate control within their domains; however, would-be absolute monarchs 
of the early modern period sought to concentrate control over the economic 
life of the state by abolishing feudal privileges. Hirst has argued that a 
synthesis of territoriality and sovereignty bestowed a number of permanent 
tangible benefits on the institution of the state: most notably, the state 
becomes the “superior political agency that determines the role and powers 
of all subsidiary governments.”118   
Third,  states may also promote the self-conscious realization that an 
ethnic group is in fact a community, with an attachment historically to a 
given territory, a distinctive culture, and a unique historical fate.  Niebhur 
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made a crucial insight to the degree of artifice, which can vary from state to 
state, that is required to hold the nation state together: “it was tempting to 
forget that communities are composed of organic and of contrived forms of 
cohesion. In civilised societies both are necessary. The necessity for both 
forms is constant, but the proportion between them is variable according to 
the culture, the degree of education in a nation and the intensity of the means 
of communication”. 119   To some extent, all national communities were 
“imagined communities,” either intellectuals invented such communities  or 
they systematized and glorified ethnic traditions  as the essence of a new 
nation.
120
 In either event, standards—laws, regulations, and norms—were 
imposed. 
Although the historical circumstances of every state has been 
different, in terms of their development, every nation state, in Europe at 
least, had a common starting point. The process began by the expansion of 
what Pounds and Ball called “core-areas” [See figure 1.2].121 These core 
areas had three salient qualities: first, they had to be able to defend 
themselves from attack and encroachment; secondly, they had to be capable 
of generating a surplus income to pay for the armed forces that could, if 
required, facilitate further expansion; thirdly, they had to have the capability 
to participate in long-distance commerce, which was usually river borne, to 
obtain materials which were not available locally. To these three, Hechter 
suggests a fourth: a more or less homogeneous ethnic group that dominated 
the area that comes to be identified with the state: Castile in Spain, Ȋle de 
France in France, the Home Counties in England, etc.  “Each of these small 
                                                 
119
 R. Niebuhr, Nations and Empires, London: Faber and Faber, 1959, p. 260  
120
 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: 
Verso, 2006.  
121
 N.J.G.Pounds &S.S.Ball, Core Areas and the Development of the European States System ,Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers Vol 54 ,No 1,1964.    
 39 
areas had, to varying degrees, distinct cultural practices from those of 
outlying, peripheral, areas.”122 These “core-areas” were all well developed 
by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
In comparison to these core areas, the peripheral, outlying areas were 
relatively isolated from one another and from the dynamism characteristic of 
the core area.  For example in south western region of medieval France, 
there was a pattern of settlements called ‘bastides’.  These fortified 
settlements in rural habitats were located in the contested zone between the 
Kings of England whose rule extended south to Aquitaine, which was part of 
the Angevin Empire, and the lands ruled by the Count of Toulouse.  
Between 1222 and 1373 over five hundred ‘bastides’ were built and they 
enabled the local population to benefit from the important economic, 
political and strategic functions these constructions performed. In this 
contested zone, local populations, occupying diverse pieces of land, had the 
political resources to declare or withhold political allegiance.
123
 
The importance of core areas in the European state system was 
enhanced by two related developments that took place in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries. First, the growth of central authority within medieval kingdoms 
gradually succeeded in undermining the autonomy of feudal units within 
their domain.  Secondly, the central authority, usually the king, managed to 
seal their state against the incursions of outside authorities.  It was that 
process that led to the modern concept of sovereignty: “[the ruler] has the 
power to constrain his subjects, while not being so constrainable by superior 
power.  The decisive criterion thus is actual control of one’s ‘estate’ by 
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one’s military power, which excludes any power within and without.”124  
These processes, internal directed against feudal competitors and external 
against emperors and popes, marked the end of the medieval structure. 
These processes were not peaceful.  “The ‘fixing’ of national spaces 
on the European map took place in the midst of widespread violence and 
warfare, particularly during the Reformation, the Counter–Reformation and 
the Thirty Years War, a conflict that claimed up to 30 per cent of the 
population in parts of central Europe.”125 European states were in a 
“competitive geopolitical environment”126 and thus policy makers had a 
powerful motivation to build administrative infrastructure enabling the 
extraction of revenue from the ruled societies in order to pay for military 
campaigns and standing armies.  The territorial state became the dominant 
political form in Europe because it : “triumphed over other possible forms 
(empire, city-state, lordship) because of the superior fighting ability which it 
derived from access to both urban capital and coercive authority over 
peasant taxpayers and army recruits.”127 
The ambiguity of border areas, the mutability of commerce, and the 
non linear progress for national community meant that  the formation and 
consolidation  of the modern state took  much longer
128
  than is normally 
supposed.  Although the inception of the modern state is often dated from 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, its consolidation, according to Smith, in 
the practice international politics is relatively recent: “the First World War 
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achieved a kind of final geopolitical shakeout, establishing a discrete system 
of national territories throughout Europe. It was final not in the sense that no 
further geopolitical change occurred; clearly it did.  Rather the form of the 
territorial system of nation states-decades, even centuries, in evolution – 
truly came to fruition only after World War One.”129  The articulation of an 
international norm was required, one that suggested that each nation should 
exercise “self-determination” through acquiring an exclusive territory and a 
state apparatus.  Such a norm did not abolish conflicts between states, but 
provided a new rationale for territorial redistribution through subversion 
and/or conquest.
130
 
Beyond the European experience, the failure of modern state 
formation is oftentimes attributed to the artificiality of the borders imposed 
on African and Asian colonies by the maritime European powers, with the 
incorporation into these territories of disparate ethnic groups.  Yet, the 
European experience also required rulers to deal with disparate ethnic 
groups residing in territories incorporated behind artificial borders.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between the core areas and their respective 
peripheries has allegedly gained little traction in the formation of states 
beyond Europe.  Acemoglu and Robinson have argued that these core-
periphery processes generate little explanatory power: “Geographic factors 
are unhelpful for explaining not only the difference we see across various 
parts of the world today but also why many nations such as Japan or China 
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stagnate for long periods and then start a rapid growth process.”131   What 
seems to have been absent in much of the rest of the world is the reinforcing 
processes of a sovereign territorial state penetrating the society, a dynamic 
market economy which facilitated the goal of a self-perpetuating growth, 
and a strenuous geopolitical environment that spurred economic and military 
competition. 
In much of the Middle East states and the indigenous Asian empires 
this dynamic was attenuated: they were largely agrarian in focus and “did 
not penetrate the society very effectively and certainly not as deeply as the 
states of the West….”  Second, “the absence of geopolitical competition for 
Asia empires robbed them of the impetus to rationalize structures at home 
and encourage innovation in technological development … the Mughal, 
Caliphate and Ottoman empires did not penetrate deeply into the societies 
over which they ruled.  The linkages between centre and region were weak 
and extended, with central power at best exercised directly only on an 
episodic basis.”132  In Africa the formation of nation states was different 
again. Here was the product of a specific colonial process whereby the 
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maritime European powers leveraged a clear advantage from their ability to 
use and apply a specific number of technologies: “The steamship and the 
railway were the battering rams with European traders could break the 
monopolies that the African coastal elites and their inland allies had tried to 
maintain over their commercial hinterlands.”133  China was a product of yet 
another unique process.  At times, there were periods of dynamism; yet its 
constituent elements were different from the competitive geopolitical 
environment of the European states: “The Chinese Empire, relying upon a 
highly developed bureaucracy drawn from the society generally and held 
together by the discipline imposed by ideology, the Chinese state during its 
periods of strength probably exercised at least as much power over many of 
its regions as did any large European state.”134 China  perceived itself 
culturally as the ‘middle kingdom,’ with a periphery of weaker and smaller 
states all of which were expected to acknowledge Chinese superiority and 
offer tribute.
135
 
Today the nation state remains pivotal: it is still the basic unit of 
international relations and it still dominates the state’s jurisdiction, though 
both have been significantly challenged since the end of the Cold War.  One 
thing is certain: the geography of the state is not a static phenomenon; it has 
undergone transformations in the past, is undergoing  significant ones now, 
and will do so in the future. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War,  
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political scientists  proclaimed the end of the state.  Globalization had 
defeated geopolitical considerations.  The most important challenge to the 
state and the territory over which it was sovereign was the advent of “a 
process in which capital moves on the globe in search of profit with no 
constraints on its activities. As a result of this process national states are 
weakened and deprived of regulatory capacity”.136  Given the impact of 
globalization, the borders of the state and the international arena beyond 
have become more porous: “as sovereignty is weakened, whether by people 
identifying with some ‘world-culture’ other than a national one, or through 
the increased activities of multinationals operating as economic units within 
the open lattice-work of nation-states, the power of the nation-state to 
determine the futures of its citizens is slackened too. However, the 
weakening of the power of the nation-state within its own borders tends to 
unleash countervailing forces to the global ones in the form of intensely 
nationalist sentiments.”137 “Globalisation” in its economic (movement of 
capital and emergence of free markets), cultural (challenges to traditional 
values via new forms of communication), political (the irresistible victory of 
liberal-democracies) and demographic (the welcoming of immigration, 
including illegal immigrants) manifestations remains vigorously 
contested.
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  Advocates and detractors mobilize cosmopolitan versus 
national values in their various defences and attacks on this process.
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Furthermore, the process of globalisation has been interpreted as 
removing two of the most important rationales for the existence of nation 
state: the ability to engage in self-defence and the competency to wage war. 
Ignatieff has summarised the enduring salience of these two qualities: 
a new interdependence might be emerging in the economic 
realm, but there is no discernible alternative to the nation state 
as the chief provider of foreign and domestic security for most 
human populations.  Commerce may be borderless, but human 
beings cannot be. They need secure territories to live in, and 
these can only be provided by states with monopolies over the 
legitimate use of force. It is difficult to imagine any global, 
regional or continental body replacing the state in these 
functions, because these bodies lack the democratic legitimacy 
if citizens are to be sent to kill and to die.
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In the aftermath of the attacks on 11
th
 September 2001, Professor John Gray 
endorsed Ignatieff’s views  by sounding the death knell of this era of 
unrestrained globalization: “the conventional view of globalisation as an 
irresistible historical trend has been shattered. We are back on the classical 
terrain of history, where war is waged not over ideologies, but over religion, 
ethnicity, territory and the control of natural resources.”141   
The implications of this argument should not be ignored.  The 
independent states that exist today are products of very different processes of 
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state formation; however, all have a relationship to the territory that they 
penetrate, control and secure.  Their function remains to sustain the artificial 
entity that is the nation state and ensure that its  borders are successfully 
defended. The decision makers in a state must sustain its geopolitics by 
retaining and balancing  three capabilities : first, the geo-strategy of military 
defence; second, understand the historical geography of nation and faculitate 
state cohesion; and, third, engage other states through diplomacy in order 
maintain alliances and deprive potential and realized enemies of a 
favourable field of action. This last function still has a an echo with some  
erstwhile policy makers.John Hillen, the former US  Assistant Secretary of 
State between 2005-07, has argued: there are too many world-views, 
ideologies, and half-baked assumptions informing the formation of US 
foreign policy.  To this cacophony of preconceived sentiments and 
assumptions about human nature and utopian fixes to the use of power in the 
international arena, he offers the following corrective: 
The answer should be the map — literally, the physical map, 
and more broadly, geopolitics classically defined, which of 
course has political geography at its root. A geopolitical 
analysis of the United States and the rest of the world offers 
better guidance for a consistent, smartly managed, prudent, and 
unapologetic exertion of American power and leadership than 
any particular political philosophy or perspective on human 
nature. Of course, the map doesn’t spit out easy answers or 
perfect policies, but geopolitical realities — many of which 
move as little as the mountains of the Hindu Kush have moved 
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in the past several thousand years — can point one in a very 
sound direction.
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 Conclusion: Looking Back and Looking Forward 
This chapter has sought to provide an understanding of the scope of 
geopolitics.  It sought to address a fundamental question: ‘ what is this field 
of study about’?  Despite problems of definition, usage, and the alleged taint 
of ideology, geopolitics has been redefined and positioned intellectually as a 
field of study growing out of geography, strategic studies and history.  The 
interdisciplinary relationships between these three academic disciplines – 
that is, geo-strategy, the  geography of state formation- inform how 
geopolitics can be carried forward in a systematic fashion.
 143
   
The relationships between these three fields do not emerge without 
paradox.  Geo-strategic thinking and action, which emerges out of the 
juxtaposition of the constraints of geography with the manoeuvres of 
enemies, are conditioned also by cultural expectations and technological 
changes, neither of which are static and each of which change according to 
different temporal dynamics.  Geography does not directly condition 
strategy; instead, it is refracted through prisms of culture and technology.  
With respect to the geography of state-formation, the most important 
paradoxical development of the past century is the rise of transnational 
ethnic groups and the international flow of commodities, finance and 
migrants- globalization.  Even as the state became the unambiguous 
sovereign over its domain, ethnic minorities and economic developments, 
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each with their own geographies, called the state’s dominance in  
international relations  into question.   
The next chapter will examine the method and theories of geopolitics.  
Methodological discussions seek to raise the question, “how to.”  How does 
geopolitics answer the issues raised by theories that juxtapose geography, 
strategy and history in international relations?  This question is important for 
two reasons.  Geopolitical methods point toward the description of the 
constellation of forces which exist or existed at a particular time and within a 
particular geographical context.  Geopolitical theories may suggest 
contemporary and even future significance of the various forces as they play 
out across specific locations and contexts; they juxtapose the enduring with 
the ephemeral thereby providing a way of explaining past change and 
predicting future developments.
144
  An important caveat is that any theory  
has its limitations:  “Although theory is never complete and is always bound 
to be at least somewhat wrong, it performs several very useful functions 
when it defines, categorizes, explains, connects and anticipates.”145 
Geopolitical political theories need to be applied to relevant case studies for 
the efficacy of the theories to be evaluated.  One result of this intellectual 
exercise will be a more systematic explanation as to why policy makers were 
both successful and unsuccessful in bringing about changes in the 
geographic scope of their policy objectives.  
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The case studies will utilise a number of different geographical 
contexts. They will draw attention to an idiographic perspective which has  a 
focus on differences rather than sameness:  “The military effects of actual 
situations primarily depend on the level of military technology, the 
characteristics and distribution of military forces, the missions of these 
forces, and the geographic characteristics of the area involved. Within this 
matrix, military geography concerns the effects induced by the area and 
seeks to predict the effects of specific conditions in specific places upon 
specific military operations.”146 This has a strong echo with respect to one of 
the puzzles that social science has to address: “Social life is set in a material 
world and that  variations in circumstance and resources, individual and 
collective, affect what goes on.”147  The aim will be to focus on the 
differences in the geographical context and go beyond description and 
relating one fact to another. It will facilitate analysis and explanation.  
Despite the variations in context, there is a particular similarity across all the  
case studies; namely strategy thought and action seeks victory, variously 
defined, in military contests.Thus, in situations where geo-strategic 
considerations are at play, geography is intimately related to strategic 
objectives: “The locations and movements selected arise from some 
overarching design aimed at defeating the enemy.  The objective of strategy 
is to minimize the prospects of resistance by maintaining mobility and the 
capacity to surprise.”148  It is this effort to develop these contrasting, yet 
elusively comparable, case studies that constitute the main dimension of this 
book.  
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There are five case studies; the first four are historically based. The 
last one has a contemporary perspective. All five have been selected to 
demonstrate the effects of the interaction between policy makers and the 
natural environment. Furthermore, they will show that the outcome of this 
interaction  is not predictable, and the assumption that political outcomes 
could be explained by focusing exclusively on the material environment as 
the causal factor is no longer valid. The implications for the three states to be 
examined: Britain, United States and China will be an ability to evaluate the 
uniqueness of their approach to the geography with respect to the state they 
each control and the geographical locations where they attempted to project 
military and political power. This was conditioned by geography but not 
determined by it. Other factors such as domestic politics, culture and 
changes in transport and weapons technology impacted as well.  
  The first examines one of the episodes in Halford Mackinder’s 
career; his time as British High Commissioner to South Russia during the 
Russian Revolution.  This case study explores two important changes.  The 
first is what Smith called the geopolitical ‘shakeout’ that occurred after the 
First World War with the demise of multinational empires.  The second 
addresses how the challenges and the internal domestic influences led 
eventually to a British Coalition government, led by Lloyd George, to 
consciously withdraw geo-strategically from South Russia where it had been 
providing military aid to the White Russian Army and to reduce the 
geopolitical scope of British foreign policy.  This was despite Mackinder 
presenting the British Cabinet with a plan that advocated geostrategic 
engagement, albeit on a smaller and more sustainable level. 
The second case study focuses on the consequences of erroneous 
geopolitical assumptions and the abject failure to recognise the geostrategic 
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implications of changing geopolitics  during World War II.  Pivotal to these 
errors and failures was the development of a transportation and weapons 
technology revolution encapsulated by the U boat.  The fall of France in 
1940 had nearly terminated Britain’s sea control and sea denial around the 
British Isles.  Britain soon thereafter attempted to re-establish a favourable 
geographical field of operations that could sustain operations against the 
Kreigsmarine in the Battle of the Atlantic. The key aspect of this campaign 
was the increase geostrategic importance attached to Northern Ireland, a 
location which enabled a more efficient protection of merchant convoys 
across the Atlantic.  The conduct of these operations based in Northern 
Ireland led to a revaluation of the geopolitics of the British Isles.  When the 
Irish Free State announced it was leaving the Commonwealth in 1949, a 
British Cabinet document concluded : “it has become a matter of first–class 
strategic importance to this country that the north should continue to form 
part of His Majesty’s dominions.”149   
The third case study examines the changing relationship between the 
geographical scope of US foreign policy and subsequent strategy from the 
late 1930s through the World War II.  Did US policy makers conclude  that 
existing geopolitical and geostrategic conceptions of the role of the United 
States had become  inadequate? America’s entry into this conflict raised two 
questions about the utilization of geopolitics.  First, was geopolitics merely 
used as a tool of propaganda, its function merely to convince the public that 
the two powerful enemies of December 1941 deserved to be defeated and 
that a global conflict was justified?  Or was geopolitics used to educate the 
US citizenry, soldiers and policy makers?  The need to wage a global war 
brought about the involvement of professional geographers on an 
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unprecedented scale. What was the nature and   content of that education?  
In the final analysis, both policy makers and senior military commanders 
appreciated the changes that were taking place, changes that suggested the 
reduced utility of absolute as compared to relative space. 
The fourth case study will address  the geopolitical challenges that the 
United States faced in the post-War world.  The emergence of a new 
geopolitical reality on the Eurasian continent, a victorious and expansive 
Soviet Union, caused the United States to formulate a grand strategy of 
containment, the scope of which would extend to the whole of the Eurasian  
rimland and entail an unprecedented peacetime expansion in the scope of 
U.S. foreign policy.Containment across Eurasia required a new geo-strategy 
that underlined a new capability to project military power on a global scale 
that was without precedent.  This would reach its apotheosis with perceived 
threats in a number of geographical locations, each of which was vested with 
a strategic importance that was not merited in terms of the existing 
geopolitical realities.  In order to escape from these assumptions regarding 
the unrelenting spread of Communism, President Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger reappraised the Sino-Soviet split and the US relationship with 
China as a new way of balancing and containing the power of the Soviet 
Union. 
The last case study addresses the expansion of contemporary China.  
The realities of Chinese expansion are dissolving the Cold war era 
geopolitical dichotomy of a Eurasian heartland contained by an alliance of 
maritime powers situated along the continental rimland.  The Chinese state 
is now constructing a number of ‘amphibian ports’ that have fused together 
overland transport via rail, road, and pipeline with intermodal maritime 
shipping via containerization.  The geostrategy implications of these 
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developments will be examined in the context of what Darwin has described 
as a “pattern of persistence.”150  He has argued that with exception of India, 
European domination of Asia was partial at best; China, on the other hand, 
endured the high water mark of European imperialism in a manner that is 
unique: “The idea of China survived both the end of the imperial monarchy 
in 1911 and the forty years of turmoil, occupation and war that followed 
soon after.  More surprising, perhaps, was China’s retention of its huge Inner 
Asian empire: Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet.  Despite the 
desperate crisis of the 1930s and 40’s, all were held on to.”151  This case 
study will speculate on, first, whether China is now in the process of uniting 
the Eurasian Heartland utilizing a different geo-strategy and, second, if the 
United States and its allies, in the future, will be challenged by a land-power 
that will bear little resemblance to the challenges that emerged from Eurasia 
in the twentieth century. 
This book addresses three interrelated questions: why does the 
geographical scope of political objectives and subsequent strategy of states 
change?  How do these changes occur?  Over what period of time do these 
changes occur?  Taken together these five case studies offer the prospect of 
converting descriptions of historical change into analytic explanations, 
thereby highlighting the importance of a number of commonly overlooked 
variables.  In addition, the case studies will illuminate the challenges that 
states face when changing the scope of their foreign policy and geo-strategy 
in response to shifts in geopolitical reality. 
                                                 
150
 J. Darwin ,After Tamerlane ,London: Penguin Books,2008 p496.  
151
 Ibid p496. 
 54 
 
